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Abstract Central Europe experienced catastrophic rain-
falls and flooding in 2010. This paper discusses a decom-
missioned shaft that was flooded by surface water, which
led to displacement of shaft backfill and an inrush of large
amounts of water into an underground pumping station.
The weather conditions for the period preceding the inrush,
the hydrogeological conditions, the quantity of water that
entered the mine dewatering systems, and the underground
hydraulic connections are all described. Uncontrolled
inflow of water as a cause of backfill saturation and the
hazard for active underground infrastructure were anal-
ysed. A need to rebuild damaged infrastructure was iden-
tified. The case study highlights the need to improve
underground mine closure requirements to ensure safe
conditions above ground, particularly in densely populated
areas.
Keywords Groundwater hazard  Backfill saturation 
Mine flooding
Introduction
The Upper Silesian Coal Basin (USCB) has a long history of
intensive coal mining, which has created a network of inter-
connected and abandoned workings, some of which are con-
nected with neighbouring mining areas (Ro´_zkowski and
Ro´_zkowski 2011). Since 1989, the mining industry in Poland
has undergone large-scale restructuring due to coal deposit
depletion and the changed economic environment. In some
cases, production stopped gradually. Adjacent operations with
uneven potential were combined to form stronger entities with
lower production costs. Due to the close proximity of many
mines and the multi-level operations, numerous connections
remain between the mines, directly through underground
workings or through safety pillars of variable thickness that
separate adjacent abandoned workings.
Complete cessation of operations and physical decom-
missioning of the mine workings was possible only in
isolated areas. As unprofitable operations or areas with
depleted resources were closed, it became necessary to
protect nearby active operations that still had economically
recoverable reserves (Bradecki and Dubin´ski 2005).
Therefore, it was often essential to maintain drainage, often
at a higher elevation, at discontinued operations.
The complicated geological and mining landscape
requires a vast drainage system, creating a regional cone of
depression. In the process of liquidation and restructuring of
the coal mines, it became necessary to reconstruct and
modify the existing individual drainage systems. The lowest
levels of the interconnections were considered, existing
safety pillars were verified, and watertight barricades were
planned and built. Bukowski (2002) drew attention to the
need to consider the water storage capacity of the rock mass,
as modified by coal exploitation, in the calculations. The
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remaining main drainage systems, and in many cases, the
yield and reserves were increased in preparation for the
raised water level. Under favourable conditions, stationary
systems in the decommissioned mines were replaced with
deep-water drainage. This reduced costs, while increasing
safety and retention capacity in the case of an uncontrolled,
rapid inflow (Bukowski 2011; Frolik and Kubica 2005).
Drainage carried out in the Siemianowice area, includ-
ing the former Siemianowice and Barbara Chorzo´w mines,
was seriously threatened in 2010, when an uncontrolled
inrush of water took place. An investigation to identify the
source of the inflow was immediately undertaken with a
view to long-term decommissioning.
Outline of the Geological Structure
and Hydrogeological Conditions
The area of water inrush was located within a local structural
trough, with its axis aligned in a NW–SE direction. Slightly
to the south of the basin’s axis is the Park shaft. In this part of
the structure, the overburden is mainly Quaternary strata
deposited as interbedded medium-grain sands and diluvial
clays that range in thickness from a few metres to about
20 m, and locally thin Triassic deposits. Further under-
ground, there are Carboniferous Ruda and Siodłowe beds of
the Upper Silesian sandstone series (GSP), in which the coal
is found. This series is dominated by sandstones, with con-
glomerate over siltstone and claystone strata. The aquifers
within the GSP complex are linked by thick sandstones
shoals, ranging from 0.2 to 44.5 m in thickness (Kotas 1994;
Fig. 1). The permeability of the water-bearing beds decrea-
ses with depth, ranging from 2.5 9 10-5 to 4.0 9 10-11 m/s.
Effective porosity also decreases with depth, from 20.9 % to
just 0.1 % (Rogo _z et al. 1987; Ro´ _zkowski 2000, 2004).
North from the axis of the trough, the overburden con-
tains sands of variable grain size up to 20 m thick. These
sands fill a subordinate, local erosion trough. The
Muschelkalk limestone (Middle Triassic) strata, composed
of limestones, marls, and limestone marls, are deposited at
the base of the Quaternary, sometimes with crystalline
limestone debris or gray crystalline limestone rubble, with
a maximum thickness of 80.0 m. The Triassic sediments
lay directly on the Ruda beds.
Fig. 1 Hydrogeological profile
of Park shaft
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The Water Hazard
Before 2010, there had been six inrushes of water into shaft
mine workings in the USCB. Water hazard assessment in
active shafts in USCB mines has been described by
Bukowski (2011). The event which became the basis of the
analysis described herein had two stages. On 2 Oct 2010, a
rapid, uncontrolled inrush of large volumes of water took
place, most likely to drainage gallery no. 1 of the main
pumping station in the Siemianowice III shaft, at the 321 m
level. Emergency procedures caused automatic deactiva-
tion of the pumps. Water flooded the main pumping station
and the adjacent workings, up to about 0.5 km in the
direction of the Ban´go´w shaft, to a height of up to 1.4 m.
The drainage system equipment was damaged or destroyed.
The rushing water left behind ferruginous sediments, and
fine shale, coal shale with coal, and even slag. During the
site visit conducted during emergency actions, a complete
loss of flow was discovered behind a barricade in the cross-
cut connecting SI–SII from colliery II (Ficinus) of the
former Siemianowice Mine. The remaining three barri-
cades in this region were functioning as usual, allowing the
free flow of suspended matter at a rate of several litres per
minute, similar to before.
The additional inflow to the pumping station within 7 h
of the inrush was estimated at about 7000–8500 m3. In the
first hour, the inflow rate reached 33.0 m3/min, then
dropped by 1/3 during the next 6 h, to about 21.0 m3/min.
Emergency protective actions allowed the ventilation
necessary to conduct further drainage through the adjacent
Ban´go´w shaft to be maintained.
After just 7 days, another uncontrolled inrush of water
area took place. Outflow from behind the barricades
gradually increased, reaching an estimated maximum of
30.0 m3/min. Inflow into the main cross-cut at the 321 m
level occurred simultaneously with the failure of barricades
near the Park shaft, which had been decommissioned sev-
eral years earlier. The pumping station in the adjacent shaft
base was flooded. The flooding of 2 km of the 321 m level
cross-cut prevented the ventilation system from properly
functioning. For another 4 days, the water level continued
to rise, until it broke through the main 321 m level cross-
cut into the nearby Ban´go´w pumping station. From then on,
the pumping station received almost double the normal
inflow of water, and was operated in emergency mode.
The Meteorological and Hydrogeological Situation
The search for the causes of this unexpected and dangerous
event began immediately after the first inrush. It was
necessary to analyse the hydrogeological and mining con-
ditions, mainly the spatial structure of the mine workings,
particularly the direct and indirect connections of neigh-
bouring mines to the surface, the inflows to adjacent
pumping stations, and finally the spatial and temporal
rainfall structure. Annual discharges pumped from aban-
doned mines from 1997 to 2007 in the USCB were com-
pared with annual rainfall data by Janson et al. (2009). The
distribution and intensity of rainfall in Poland and Central
Europe in 2010 was very unusual, and caused a series of
major floods. The nearby Institute of Meteorology and
Water Management (IMGW) station at Czeladz´ recorded
1038 mm of rainfall in 2010; the average rainfall in this
region is &650–700 mm. The monthly distribution of
rainfall was also highly unusual, with a maximum in May
(Fig. 2).
Rainfall during May 2010 totalled 267 mm, exceeding
the mean value by several times. Torrential rainstorms
generated greater surface runoff than many drainage sys-
tems could handle. Surface flooding occurred in many
places, including the area where the analysed inrush of
water into the mine workings took place 5 months later.
The area affected by the flooding, dictated by the mor-
phology of the area, was in Zwycie˛stwa Street in Siemi-
anowice S´la˛skie, northwest of the Park shaft. The flood
covered an undeveloped area, mainly used for agricultural
purposes, with an area of 3.136 ha. The volume of accu-
mulated water was estimated at 47,000 m3. After a reser-
voir was created, the ditch and the culvert at Zwycie˛stwa
Street was cleaned, and drainage was directed towards
Rze˛sa Pond. In September 2010, 108 mm of rainfall was
recorded, mostly in the last days of the month. The average
September rainfall from 1991 to 2010 for the IMGW sta-
tion at Czeladz´ is 66 mm.
Fig. 2 Monthly precipitation at the IMGW Czeladz´ station in 2010
130 Mine Water Environ (2016) 35:128–135
123
Water Flow into the Drainage System
Heavy rainfall in 2010 increased water inflow into the drai-
nage systems of both active and inactive mines. All pumping
stations operated by the Central Department of Mine Drai-
nage (Centralny Zakład Odwadniania Kopaln´, CZOK) in the
Siemianowice area recorded increased groundwater inflow
from May 2010. In the Siemianowice drainage area, there are
two stationary drainage systems to maintain 13,250 m of
mine tunnels and 4 shafts to a maximum depth of 1964 m:
• the Siemianowice system includes the Siemianowice III
and Ban´go´w shafts and two pumping stations at the
321 m level, and;
• the Chorzo´w system includes the Kolejowy I and
Zygmunt-August II shafts and the main drainage
pumping stations at levels 321 and 630 m.
These two systems previously served the Siemianowice
and Barbara Chorzo´w mines, which are now connected by
a water gallery at the 630 m level, where the water flows
by gravity from the abandoned workings of the Siemi-
anowice Mine to the stationary pumping station at the
Kolejowy I shaft. The overflow elevation between these
mines is at 327.0 m above sea level (ASL).
The Siemianowice drainage area is defined by historical
mines with relatively shallow seams. It receives water
predominantly from the drainage basin and hydraulic
connections. The volume of free water accumulated in the
pore space was practically depleted. Such inflows are, by
definition, dependent on rainfall infiltration into the rock
mass. Inflow time is variable and depends on the path
through which the water migrates.
The high May 2010 rainfall intensified inflows into the
Siemianowice and Chorzo´w drainage systems by nearly
20 %. From May to September 2010, the Siemianowice
pumping station pumped 600,000 m3 of water more than
average. Variation in the mean monthly inflows reached
34 % in the case of the Siemianowice system, and 28 %
within the Chorzo´w system. In both cases, the largest
inflows were recorded in September 2010, and the smallest
occurred in March and April 2010. The summary of
inflows to the individual pumping stations of the Siemi-
anowice and Chorzo´w systems is shown in Fig. 3.
The average water supply to the Siemianowice area for
2010 reached 16.4 and 14.9 m3/min at the Chorzo´w pumping
station. In the final stage of mining, between 1989 and 1998,
the total inflow into the Siemianowice coal mine ranged from
19.8 to 28.5 m3/min, classifying the mine as one of the
wettest in the Bytom basin (Probierz and Zaja˛c 2000).
An analysis of the results presented in Fig. 2 shows
considerable differences. During 2010, the amount of water
pumped by the Kolejowy I shaft pumping station at the
630 m level decreased by about 10 %. This level is much
deeper than the three others interacting in this system, and
most likely does not have a direct hydraulic connection
with the surface. These three other pumping stations, built
at the 321 m level, showed substantially increased inflows.
The amount of water discharged from the Ban´go´w pump-
ing station during October 2010 may have been underes-
timated due to the emergency operations and changes to the
layout of the drainage system. The data (Fig. 2) also
indicate that inflows to the individual pumping stations
depended on the amount of rainfall, which indicates a
connection between the pumping stations and the surface.
Reasons for Water Inrush into the Siemianowice
III Pumping Station
The likely scenarios of events were reconstructed by ana-
lysing the water supply and drainage conditions, the geo-
logical data and mining practices, observations made
during the site visits, and eye-witness accounts. Consider-
ation was given to, among others, the Team of Advisors of
the Director of CZOK, the Consultative Team Committee
for Water Hazard Recognition and Control at SRK SA, and
the State Mining Authority Committee for Water Hazards.
In the course of investigating the causes of the flooding of
the Siemianowice III pumping station, it was discovered
that the sequence of events began with the displacement of
backfill in the Park shaft. The shaft is indirectly connected
to the surface by a mining excavation.
Decommissioning of the Park Shaft
A total of 345 Polish coal mine shafts were decommis-
sioned from 1970 to 2010 (Czaja 2011). Major events
during decommissioning, including the explosion of
methane in the decommissioned Morcinek mine shaft in
1994 and the blockage of the backfill above the base of the
Fig. 3 Inflows to the individual pumping stations in the Siemianow-
ice drainage area (CZOK)
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Jadwiga shaft in the Pora˛bka Klimonto´w Mine in 2000,
caused a very careful analysis of all the shaft decommis-
sioning projects. Most shafts had been decommissioned in
the last few years of the twentieth century, and the
guidelines and design requirements were also developed at
that time.
In a shaft filled with granular material, the weight of the
material causes vertical and horizontal pressures. The
horizontal pressure causes friction against the shaft lining,
the magnitude of which depends on the coefficient of
friction (dependent on the type of backfill) and the lateral
earth pressure. With increased depth, both the horizontal
and vertical pressures increase, but stabilise at a depth,
based on theoretical calculations and practical experience,
approximately equal to eight times the diameter of the shaft
(Czaja 2011). The dry backfill pressure in the shaft can be





where c = the bulk density of the rock material, F = the
cross-sectional area of the shaft, U = the circumference of
the shaft, H = the depth of the backfill, f = the friction
coefficient against the lining of the shaft, and k = the ratio
of vertical to horizontal pressure, according to the formula:
k ¼ 1
k
where k = the horizontal spreading coefficient defined
according to the relationship:
k ¼ tan2 45  /
2
 
ø = the angle of internal friction.
The pressure tends asymptotically to the value of pmax,
according to the formula:
pmax ¼ kR
f
where R = hydraulic radius.
A large frictional force from dry backfill against the
lining does not exert too much pressure on the lining, even
in deep shafts. Over time, water infiltrates the backfill. The
presence of water reduces the frictional force of the backfill
material against the shaft’s lining, but the accumulated
water in the shaft adds additional pressure, as described by:
P ¼ hwcw
where hw = the hydraulic head and cw = the specific
gravity of the aqueous solution in the shaft.
The difference in hydrostatic pressure between the
backfill and the ‘dry’ tunnels located below was so great
that sliding of the backfill is practically inevitable, which
led to the sudden failure of the soaked backfill into the
mine workings. The backfill movement increased the
dynamic pressure, which in turn caused the backfill to
move into the horizontal workings in the shaft base. This
sudden release of support to the internal lining of the shaft,
especially above the backfill, led to the destruction of the
lining and ‘collapse’ of the shaft.
The sudden subsidence of the backfill created negative
pressure, which sucked air into the interior of the shaft in
an amount equal to the void volume created above the
backfill. Since the top of the shaft is covered with a cap, the
negative pressure unclogged the least resistant hydraulic
connections. This may have caused sinkholes to form,
shallow excavations to collapse, induced the formation of
voids and discontinuous deformations, and the devastation
of underground infrastructure and installations, including
sewage and drainage systems.
In designing shaft decommissioning, the first priority
should be to solve this fluidisation problem. For this pur-
pose, different types of retaining structures are built in the
shaft base to prevent backfill from creeping into horizontal
galleries. A barricade must therefore be able to withstand a
pressure equal to the hydrostatic pressure of the water and
rock column with a height corresponding to the distance
between the shaft collar and the barricade. In the case of a
200 m deep shaft, a pressure of 2.0 MPa should be
assumed. Therefore, it is necessary to build the barricade a
few metres thick, using materials that provide the required
strength (Czaja 2011). The equilibrium horizontal pressure
at the barricade is:
Px ¼ s h px ¼ T1 þ 2T2
where s = the width of the horizontal gallery, h = the
height of the horizontal gallery, px = the horizontal pres-
sure acting on the dam, T1 = the friction against the floor
of the horizontal gallery, and T2 = the friction against the
side walls of the horizontal gallery. The static frictional
force of the backfill against the side walls and the floor of







The formula used to calculate the length of the base of
the slope to stabilize the backfill in the inlet to the shaft is:
l ¼ 2sk Pþ chð Þ
cf 2sþ hkð Þ
which shows that the saturation of the backfill changes the
equilibrium conditions of the barricade in two ways: First,
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soaking of the backfill reduces its friction coefficient, f, and
second, the accumulation of water in the shaft increases the
weight of the backfill and the vertical pressure, P.
Causes of Backfill Slippage in the Park Shaft
The Park shaft was decommissioned in two stages by
building a reinforced concrete support plate about 127 m
above the base of the shaft, i.e. at the 206 level. The
backfilling was performed separately for each of the indi-
vidual parts over a few years, starting in the upper part of
the shaft. A schematic diagram of the decommissioning
and shaft connections is shown in Fig. 4.
After the Siemianowice III shaft pumping station floo-
ded, subsidence of the backfill occurred about 65 m below
the ground surface. Displacement of the backfill might
have taken place throughout the entire shaft depth, not justFig. 4 Diagram of the decommissioned and existing connections in
the Park shaft, with the shallow subsurface galleries
Fig. 5 Schematic sketch of the Park shaft position, showing both old mine workings and modern infrastructure
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in the upper segment. This may have been due to
destruction of the:
• carrier plate and slippage of the backfill below the
plate’s original level, or
• barricades built in the galleries above the carrier plate
and displacement of the backfill into these workings.
The first of these possibilities seems more likely, based
on the disappearance of water flow from the cross-cut
connecting Siemianowice I–Siemianowice II, as was
observed after the first inrush of water into the Siemi-
anowice III shaft pumping station. Assuming that the lower
part of the Park shaft was decommissioned in accordance
with the operations plan, damage to the reinforced concrete
plate would have caused the backfill to move into the base
of the shaft. Next, with the water, the backfill material
(which included slag, ferruginous sediments, fine silt shale,
and coal shale) was transported into the cross-cut con-
necting Siemianowice I–Siemianowice II and, finally,
towards the pumping station at the Siemianowice III shaft.
This backfill appeared with the first inrush of waters on 2
Oct 2010.
Lack of drainage through the SI–SII cross-cut flowing
from the Ficinus colliery, as well as water flowing through
the connection with the surface, caused further damming of
water in the mine workings, particularly in the old work-
ings of seams 615 and 620, which led to overflow through
the galleries in the vicinity of the Park shaft and through
the barricades protecting the shaft, to the Siemianowice III
pumping station on 9 Oct 2010.
Analysis of the meteorological data and events result-
ing in the flooding of the pumping station at the Siemi-
anowice III shaft indicates that the cause of backfill
slippage might have been a sudden uncontrolled flow of
rainwater from the surface to the decommissioned shaft.
Analysis of the hydraulic connections between the Park
shaft and the mine workings indicate that the shaft was
connected to the backfill by a cross-cut and to the shallow
mining galleries that had been used for delivering the
backfill (Fig. 5).
Analysis of archival materials made available by the
Siemianowice City Council also points to a connection
between the shallow underground workings and the storm
water collector. This hypothesis was confirmed during a
site visit by the authors.
Conclusions and Final Remarks
Analysis of the documented material leads to the conclu-
sion that a sudden inflow of water from near the Park shaft
caused the flooding of Siemianowice III shaft the pumping
station. This inrush was caused by the release of water
stored in the shaft backfill. The amount of water stored in
the shaft had increased over the previous few months, due
to infiltration of the intense rainfalls that occurred in May
and at the end of September 2010.
As the shaft backfill became saturated, the backfill
material began to slip, reducing the hydraulic pressure on
the reinforced concrete plate, and causing it to slip. Con-
sequently, the plate was damaged and the saturated backfill
entered the shaft base, followed by sudden displacement of
the backfill into the underlying galleries. The movement of
the backfill resulted in approximately 70,000 m3 flowing
towards the stationary Siemianowice III shaft pumping
station. Furthermore, the abrupt slippage of the backfill
would have induced negative pressure on the shaft collar,
unclogging hydraulic connections with the subsurface
infrastructure, and probably damaging the rainwater col-
lector, though it is also possible that this damage might
have occurred before the backfill slipped. In the latter case,
the damaged rainwater collector could have been the direct
cause of excessive amounts of rainwater entering into the
Park shaft.
A concurrent, almost immediate increase in the inflow to
the Ban´go´w pumping station, which plays a vital drainage
role in the Siemianowice region, was observed following
the increase in rainfall. This is evidence for the unclogging
of hydraulic connections, a process that is partly respon-
sible for CZOK’s cost increase.
The slippage of backfill into the Park shaft resulted in a
lack of support for the upper section of the shaft at a depth
65 m from the surface. Because the shaft is located in the
city and the surroundings of the shaft are heavily urbanised,
it was necessary to immediately protect the shaft by sup-
porting the void with backfill. In order to prevent repeated
water inflow into the backfill, it is also necessary to rebuild
the destroyed subsurface infrastructure, including the
intersection of the damaged transport excavation with the
rainwater collector.
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